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Introduction
The European construction has given a fundamental contribution to increase 
competition among irms. Market exchanges have been hugely facilitated through 
the creation of the Single European Market. The SEM has given impetus to the 
economic development. The sequence of enlargements has progressively widened 
the dimension of the SEM since 1973, giving the enterprises more commercial op-
portunities and creating more competition.
Firstly, this paper examines the liberal bases of EU competition policy. Secondly, 
it focuses on liberalizations, speciically on gas market liberalization.
1. Competition in the liberal thought: entry freedom, competition order, state aid, 
and cartels.
In the present section, in order to explore the liberal bases of EU competition 
policy, attention is concentrated on four aspects of competition theory:
I) entry freedom and potential competition;
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II) effective competition and the correlated concept of competition order;
III) state aid;
IV) cartels.
Not surprisingly, these elements are also a part of the deinition of competition 
that can be drawn from the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Entry freedom. As a starting point, the liberal theory provides a vision of the 
competition process quite close to the one used in ordinary life. The word compe-
tition recalls irstly sport contests where every participant has the same chances to 
be successful. No one has additional advantages. Transferred to the economic life, 
competition means freedom to enter into a market and play the game under a neutral 
set of rules. No one is protected, no one is privileged and the game takes place on 
a lat ground. Neutrality of the regulatory framework is essential, as differential treat-
ments (e.g. State aid to public enterprises) jeopardise entry freedom. Consequently, 
a market is competitive not accordingly to the number of producers, but on the base 
of the freedom to entry. Uncompetitive conditions may prevail in a market where 
a relatively high number of enterprises are producing and selling and where legal 
barriers prevent newcomers from entering the competition with the existing actors. 
On the contrary, a market where there is only one or a few enterprises is competitive 
if the enterprises fear potential competition and their market conduct is determined 
accordingly. To put it differently, it is the risk of new competitors that may threaten 
proit rates or market shares (or both) of dominant irms that compels them to adopt 
process and product innovations in order to maintain their competitiveness.
Potential competition is even more eficient than effective competition. An en-
trepreneur competing in a certain market knows his competitors. He knows their 
products and prices, can estimate their costs and so on. However, potential compet-
itors are like ghosts. The entrepreneur does not know anything about them, they are 
his nightmare. Potential competitors represent a countervailing power1 to already 
established businesses and exert a relevant pressure on their strategies. 
When legal entry barriers are low or non-existent, the number of potential entrants 
increases. The larger the number of potential entrants, the larger the likelihood that 
some of them will turn into an effective competitor by entering the concerned market. 
The worst a State can do against competitive markets is build up legal entry barriers 
in order to shield the status quo of a certain market structure by protecting the enter-
prises already existing and operating in it. Several times these protected enterprises, 
examples of crony capitalism, are referred to as national champions, which means 
strategic enterprises (energy, telecommunications, etc.) are so important that they 
do not deserve exposure to the waves of free markets and international competition, 
but to be hold in the maternal arms of the State.
The concept of potential competition is deeply rooted into the liberal thought. In 
1924, the great Italian liberal economist Luigi Einaudi wrote [1973, p. 833]:
1 This expression and concept comes from J.K. Galbraith, see: American Capitalism: The concept of 
Countervailing Power, 1952.
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“Until the monopoly, master or warden, is free, as long as it is lawful for anyone 
to criticize him and attempting to shoot it down, can it cause some damage; but it is 
perhaps not relevant and transitional. The necessary condition for a lasting equilib-
rium […] is not the actual existence of the competition. It is the juridical possibility 
of having competition. To the State we should ask nothing except that granting 
everyone a chance to deny the monopoly of someone else.”
What Einaudi deines as “juridical possibility of having competition” is poten-
tial competition. What the State has to do is to remove legal entry barriers so as to 
give any entrepreneur the power to deny the possibility for a monopolistic irm to 
continue to behave as such.
Competition as “discovery” and as “order”. An environment where free entry 
is ensured leads us to the Hayekian concept of competition. First, competition is 
a process of discovery, as new processes, new products, new markets, and new 
eficient combinations of productive factors are found under the pressure of com-
petitive forces. Secondly, what is relevant is the process leading to a certain result, 
not the result itself. When a single undertaking is producing in a certain sector, we 
must distinguish whether this position has been obtained by merits or by the use of 
power. In this latter case, conditions of monopoly are prevailing. 
Quite near to Hayek’s concept of competition is the one developed by Walter 
Eucken and more generally by the Freiburg School or Ordoliberal School [Nemo 
and Petitot, 2006, pp. 911– 936]. According to this school, competition is an in-
strument for building a free society. Eucken’s concept of “complete competition” 
(wollständiger Wettbewerb) is only apparently similar to the neo-classical one. The 
number of participants on the market is not relevant for Eucken; but the coordination 
of individual market conducts through prices is. Each producer is facing a demand 
curve. This fact implies that irms must hold a certain degree of market power. 
However, in contrast to the Misesian tradition, a competitive market needs a set of 
rules in order to work in an eficient way. Pure laissez-faire may not necessarily lead 
to complete competition. It might favour the rise of monopolistic market structures 
where distorted prices fail to play their role as regulators of the economic process. 
The essence of the market economy is a “competition order” (Wettbewerbsordnung) 
guaranteeing equal conditions for all players. The ordoliberals are against direct 
State intervention in the economy and State-led economic planning, but they favour 
the organization of public institutions to preserve “complete competition” and to 
realize the “competition order”. This order can be achieved only by means of an 
economic constitution bound to preserve market competition face monopolistic 
pressures. In this light, constitutional principles would inspire ordinary legislation. 
An anti-trust legislation drawn from the constitutional principles and a competition 
authority are the institutional elements of the “competition order”.
State aid control. The best a State can do, in order to enhance competition, is 
guaranteeing entry freedom and a level playing ield. In a market with entry freedom, 
State aid control preserves potential and effective competition. State aid produces 





unintentional consequences and does not provide the results attended by those who 
have invented and enforced it. Besides, State aid determines an unsound allocation 
of resources leading to a reduction of labour and capital productivity. Consequently, 
given a speciic quantity of these two productive factors, the overall production is 
less than the level which could have been attained without the intervention of the 
State. Most of State interventions claim that they do not restrain production, but con-
versely enhance the productivity of the economic system. The historical experience 
and evidence show how fallacious this statement is and how far away from these 
expectations the results of State interventions in sectors such as, for instance, steel 
have been [Leboutte, 2008]. The building-up of ineficient concerns champions in 
devouring resources (provided by the taxpayers) rather than in the creation of wealth 
for the beneit of the citizens.
As in the case of money (the famous Gresham Law) where State aid is provided, 
the bad irm rules out the good one off the market. The competition policy of a na-
tional State or of a supranational institution (the European Commission, for instance) 
should be axed on assuring the highest degree of freedom of entry into the economic 
scene, essentially by eliminating legal barriers.
Cartels. In the Liberals’ Oxford Manifesto2 of 1947 we read: 
“The suppression of economic freedom must lead to the disappearance of political 
freedom. We oppose such suppression, whether brought about by State ownership 
or control or by private monopolies, cartels and trusts.”
Liberals oppose, in principles, monopoles, cartels and trusts, however, their 
position is more articulated than the neo-classical one. A cartel, a dominant position 
in a market or what is referred to as “market power” is not necessarily harmful or 
anti-competitive. It is surely against competition when its strength or inner stability 
is the consequence of entry impossibility, because of legal barriers, even in the form 
of State aid. When legal barriers prevent new competitors from entering a market, 
existing producers can be stimulated to set up a horizontal agreement to ix prices 
or to share markets and so on. However, the same type of agreement cannot be con-
sidered anti-competitive and harmful to consumers when the condition of free entry 
is respected. Potential competition is impeding the proliferation of anti-competition 
cartels. It is the watchdog against monopolistic market conducts.
The TFEU is not providing any deinition of what competition is. Consequently, 
its meaning has to be drawn out of the contents of articles 101–109 of the TFEU.
We propose the following deinition:
A policy bound to: 1) detect and deter cartels among irms; 2) avoid mergers 
containing the threat of abuse of dominant position by an undertaking in the market, 
3) control and prohibit State aid to enterprises, 4) promote liberalisations. 
Anti-cartel policies, prohibition of State and promotion of liberalizations repre-
sent the four basic elements of the liberal competition theory.
2  See: http://www.liberal-international.org/editorial.asp?ia_id=535
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2. The ordoliberal bases of the EU’s competition policy
In this section we focus on the ordoliberal bases of EU competition policy [McLa-
chlan and Swan, 1963] 3:
“It is (…) no exaggeration to state that, economically, the Rome Treaty is ba-
sically a Treaty for more competition; (…) it (competition) has been considered as 
one of the principal pillars on which our building rests.”
This quotation gives a correct view of the economic idea behind the European 
construction. The need for a single market was felt by the founding fathers of Eu-
rope, both on theoretical and political level. Consequently, concerns about a policy 
for preserving competition were strongly felt when the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and European Economic Community (EEC) treaties where 
negotiated. In 1961, the European Commissioner in charge of Competition Policy, 
Hans von der Groeben, expressed himself in the following way in front of the Eu-
ropean Parliament [McLachlan and Swan, 1963]4:
“It is… beyond dispute, and the authors of the Treaty were fully aware of this, 
that it would be useless to bring down trade barriers between the Member States if 
the Governments or private industry were to remain free through economic and iscal 
legislation, through subsidies or cartel-like restrictions on competition, virtually to 
undo the opening of the markets and to prevent, or at least unduly to delay the action 
needed to adapt them to the Common Market.”
Von der Groeben was an oficial at the German Ministry of Economic Affairs 
in 1952 and in charge of implementing the ECSC Treaty. In that same year, Ludwig 
Erhard, the Minister in charge, appointed Alfred Müller-Armack as head of the 
Central policy unit of the Ministry. Both Müller-Armack and Ehrard are prominent 
adherent of the Ordoliberal School. We cannot thus be surprised in inding the concept 
of competition developed by this School at the root of the EEC competition policy. 
According to von der Groeben [McLachlan and Swan, 1963]: 
“Because in the Common Market competition has an important part to play in 
giving guidance to producers, and because any distortion of competition is a threat 
to the best supply of goods in the Community. In all our six national economies the 
day-to-day co-ordination of individual economic plans and measures depends on 
the functioning of the market; the supplies the consumers wish to have and those 
the producers are able to provide are so attuned to one another by the play of prices 
that the maximum of satisfaction results.”
3 Mussard R., The Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices under the Common Market Treaty, 
[in:] Restrictive Practices, Patents, Trade Marks and Unfair Competition in the Common Market, In-
ternational and Comparative Law Quarterly Supplementary Publication No. 4, 1962, p. 17. Quoted by: 
[McLachlan and Swan, 1963]. 
4 European Parliamentary Assembly Debates, October 19, 1961. Quoted by: [McLachlan and Swan, 
1963].





From 1958 to 1963, Müller-Armack was the German state secretary for European 
affairs, and von der Groeben held the post of European Commissioner until 1970. 
We also have to notice that both Müller-Armack and von der Groeben, participated 
intensively in the negotiations for the Rome Treaty [Melchionni and Ducci, 2007, pp. 
114–139]. The latter and Pierre Uri were responsible for drafting the Spaak Report.
3. The liberalisation of EU gas market
The EU energy policy objective concerning gas is that of the gradual liberalisa-
tion of this market and the consequent creation of a single European energy market. 
Between 1996 and 2003, two gas directives have been adopted requiring, among 
other things, full market opening, abolition of import monopolies and unbundling of 
vertically integrated companies. These irst directive demonstrated clearly the beneits 
of the liberalisation of the gas market in terms of price reductions, increased eficien-
cy, higher quality, and enhanced competitiveness. However, in spite of the adopted 
regulatory framework and the abovementioned gains, some gas market malfunc-
tioning has persisted in the form of entry barriers and inal consumer’s (households, 
commerce and industry) restricted freedom to choose. For these reasons, the second 
gas directive aimed at ensuring level playing ield, publishing of tariffs prior to their 
entry into force, reducing the risks of market dominance and predatory behaviour. The 
second gas directive indicated that by 2007 inal consumers (households and irms) 
in the EU had to enjoy effective freedom to choose their gas suppliers. However, by 
2007 several barriers of entry and free competition still remained, along with other 
market malfunctioning. This situation led the Commission to start a process leading 
to the so-called third energy package including, among others, the third gas directive.
The third gas directive
As a part of the so-called third energy package, in July 2009 the European Par-
liament and the Council have adopted the directive 2009/735.  The following parts 
of this Directive point to the liberal features embodied in EU’s policies: 
“The internal market for gas aims to deliver real choice for all consumers of the 
EU, be they citizens or business. Actually the freedoms which the Treaty guarantees 
are achievable only in a full open market, which enables all consumers freely to 
choose their suppliers and all suppliers freely to deliver to their customers. However, 
there are obstacles to the sales of gas on equal terms and without discrimination or 
disadvantages in the Community. […] Functioning open gas markets are essential 
for public security, for the competitiveness of the economy and for the well-being 
of the citizens of the Union. To create a level playing ield at retail level, effective 
5  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:211:0036:0054:EN:PDF
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market access for all market players, including new entrants, non-discriminatory and 
cost-relective balancing mechanisms are necessary […]. Promoting fair competition 
and easy access for different suppliers should be of the utmost importance for Mem-
ber States in order to allow consumers to take full advantage of the opportunities of 
a liberalized internal market in natural gas.”
In conclusion, the internal market for gas aims to guarantee inal users freedom to 
choose. Unbundling, creating an effective entry freedom and non-discriminatory access 
to the gas networks, develops competition and promotes investments in the internal 
market for gas. Market prices should provide the correct incentives for the development 
of the networks, including cross-border interconnections. An eficient working of the 
gas market is thus, an indispensable ingredient for the security of energy supplies and 
more generally for public security and peaceful international relations.
The working of the internal market for natural gas
Gas wholesale markets in the EU Member States are largely dominated by 
incumbent irms, controlling imports and internal production. Imports have been 
rapidly increasing since the beginning of the eighties for all European countries. 
Consequently, their share on overall inal consumptions has been on the rise, passing 
from 40% in 1985 to 75% in 2012. This means that the EU is producing around 25% 
of its gas needs. As indicated in Table 1 the gap between total consumptions and 
internal production is widening. 
The situation emerging out of Table 2 indicates the dimension and strength of 
power in the hands of monopolistic importers. Traditionally, the dominant monopolist 
in European markets has been State-owned enterprise. Several times this enterprise 
has also been the owner of the internal distribution network and storage facilities 
and the exclusive provider of gas to inal consumers. Table 1 data show the dominant 
irm degree of control over gas supply in their home markets. 
Table 1. EU-28. Gas production, imports and consumptions (millions tonnes of oil equivalent)
Year Imports Primary production EU consumptions
2003 285 201 486
2004 299 205 504
2005 323 191 514
2006 335 182 517
2007 329 171 500
2008 349 172 521
2009 338 157 495
2010 365 159 524
2011 355 141 496
2012 344 133 477
Source: [Eurostat, 2014]





Table 2. Dominant irm control of gas supply, 2004 (in billions cm and percentages) 
Countries Total imports  (bln cm) Import share
Total domestic 
prod. (bln cm) Production share
Austria 9 80–90% 2 –
Belgium 16 90–100% 0 –
Czech Republic 9 90–100% <1 –
Denmark 0 – 10 80–90%
France 49 90–100% 1 –
Great Britain 13 20–30% 105 40–50%
Germany 88 90–100% 18 80–90%
Hungary 11 90–100% 3 90–100%
Italy 67 60–70% 13 80–90%
Netherlands 18 50–60% 73 90–100%
Poland 10 90–100% 5 90–100%
Slovakia 7 90–100% <1 –
Source: [European Commission, 2006, p. 23].
As we can see, with the exception of the United Kingdom, the dominant irm 
share of imports and domestic production is in most cases between 90% and 100%. 
The most favourable conditions in the UK are the consequence of the unbundling 
of the former gas monopolies. In such a highly concentrated market, competition 
is not working and its beneits in terms of lower prices, wider consumer choice and 
higher levels of eficiency and innovation are not felt. 
Hereafter we summarize the main inding of the inquiry by European Commis-
sion [European Commission, 2006, p. 23]:
 
1) The gas sector maintains a high degree of market concentration, generated by 
entry and expansion barriers. Dominant irms largely control up-stream gas imports 
and domestic gas production. Potential new entrants are strongly dependent “on 
vertically integrated incumbents [dominant irms] for services through the supply 
chain”. 
2) A major barrier to enter is represented by the still high level of unbundling 
(the decoupling between network owner and the network user). The network owners 
“are suspected of favouring their own afiliates”. Consequently, the new entrants 
“lack effective access to networks, despite the existing unbundling provisions”.
3) A second barrier is represented by the “prevalence of long term contracts 
between gas producers and incumbent importers”. Actually, in this situation it is 
“very dificult for new entrants to access gas on the up-stream markets”.
4) National markets are still relatively isolated. The transit capacity is controlled 
by dominant irms having “little interest to expand capacity to serve the needs of 
new entrants”.
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5) Information symmetry is another way to reduce entry barriers. However, 
between incumbent irms and new entrants, the information asymmetry is ample.
6) Liberalizations give full advantage to inal consumers (private and enter-
prises) only if price formation is left to market forces. Actually, “regulated supply 
tariffs below market prices discourage new entry”. 
7) The length of retail contracts is another constraint for new entrants. Final 
consumers “demand more competitive offers from non-incumbent suppliers and 
regret the absence of pan-European supply offers”.
Conclusions
Today, in spite of the effective regulatory framework elaborated and approved 
by the EU institutions, the European gas market is still relatively closed to com-
petition. Incumbent undertakings still hold the most of privileges they had in past 
times. Unbundling, wholesale and retail contracts duration, information and lack 
of market integration represent the main entry barriers, preventing inal consumers 
from harvesting full beneits of the liberalisation process and from the opening of 
the markets to competition. 
The crisis that has been hitting Europe since 2008 has not helped the development 
of the European gas market. We have seen a sort of euro-sclerosis, like the one of the 
seventies. We saw a kind of multiple sclerosis attacking the policies of liberalization 
in recent years. Europe nowadays is facing a major problem: lack of growth and, 
consequently, unemployment. How to restore growth is a matter widely discussed 
by economists, policymakers and pundits. The SEM and its soul, competition, are 
the two main assets of the European Union. Only by completing the former and 
enhancing the latter, Europe will be able to ind a sustainable path for growth. 
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Liberalne podstawy polityki konkurencji UE a rynek gazu
Traktat o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej nie zawiera deinicji konkurencji. Zaproponowana w pracy 
deinicja mówi, że jest to polityka zmierzająca do wykrywania i zapobiegania powstawaniu karteli, uni-
kania fuzji, które mogą prowadzić do nadużywania pozycji dominującej, kontroli i ograniczania pomocy 
publicznej i promowania liberalizacji. W dalszej części pracy poszczególne elementy tej deinicji są poddane 
szerszej analizie: swoboda wchodzenia na rynek, zasady konkurencji, pomoc państwowa oraz kartele. Libe-
ralizacja jest ściśle powiązana z koncepcją Finaudiego dotyczącą możliwości zapewnienia konkurencji na 
rynku. Trzecia Dyrektywa Gazowa jest przykładem takiego podejścia. Jednak postępy w jej implementacji 
są niewielkie. Co więcej, kryzys spowodował pojawienie się swoistej eurosklerozy w procesie liberalizacji. 
Dynamizacja tego procesu jest niezbędna do odbudowania wzrostu gospodarczego w Europie.
The liberal bases of EU competition policy and the case of gas sector
The TFEU is not deining competition. The deinition we propose is: A policy bound to: detect and 
deter cartels; avoid mergers leading to abuse of dominant position, control and prohibit State aid, promote 
liberalisations. This deinitions contains the mail elements of the liberal theory of competition. The paper 
explores them: entry freedom, competition order, state aids and cartels. Liberalizations are strictly linked 
to Einaudi’s concept of “juridical possibility of having competition”. The third Gas Directive represents 
an example of this “juridical possibility”. Progresses in its application have been small. Furthermore the 
crisis has produced a sort of euro-sclerosis of the liberalization process. The revitalization of liberalisations 
is essential to regain growth in Europe.   
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